讲座时间：2021年3月29日下午13:30

讲座地点：bevictor伟德（6号学院楼）210会议室

主讲人：郑捷 副教授

主持人：罗俊 副教授

讲座主题：Self-Commitment for Cooperation
     Abstract: Methods and mechanisms for sustaining cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma settings have been of tremendous interest across disciplines. In this study, we present a new mechanism for promoting cooperation via self-commitment, with the features of clear prediction, easy implementation, voluntary participation, and almost-belief-free equilibrium. Players have the option to voluntarily put a fraction of their endowment into a deposit account, and mechanisms differ based on the rule for the deposit being refunded and the size of deposit. Based on the strength of the rule for cooperative behavior, the game is either transformed into a situation in which placing a deposit and cooperating only with other deposit holders is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, or relies on non-monetary payoffs in order to promote cooperation. We implement the mechanism in three different settings. In the first setting, students in an undergraduate economics course play the game for extra credit points on their final exam, and are matched with a fellow student in the class ex-post. In the second setting, US Mechanical Turk workers play the game with another worker. The third setting is a traditional laboratory experiment with 4 different treatments of 2 by 2 design (level of restriction and size of deposit). Our experimental results show that the self-commitment mechanism successfully separates cooperators from defectors ex-ante, with an overall take-up rate of over 50 percent for the one-shot experiments. In addition, between 65 and 80 percent of those taking up the commitment subsequently chose cooperation. Our results also imply that learning is important when subjects are not familiar with the mechanism. These results suggest that our mechanism could be useful, both in sorting individuals based on their preferences for cooperation, as well as in promoting socially efficient outcomes.

主讲人简介：

 郑捷，清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授，博士生导师，清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任，清华大学互联网产业研究院产业学者。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编，Research in Economics副编。现为中国信息经济学会常务理事，中国微观经济理论论坛学术委员会委员，中国行为与实验经济学论坛学术委员会委员，美国亚洲经济研究学会(American Committee on Asian Economic Studies)执行理事，国际行为经济学促进学会(Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, SABE)理事。研究领域包括信息经济学、产业经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学，研究主题涵盖机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题和参照依赖、自我控制、互惠利他等行为问题，通过运用理论和实验相结合的分析手段研究不完全信息环境下的个体行为、多方互动、市场均衡。先后主持多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题获“特优“评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。已有研究工作已发表于American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名国际期刊，且有部分工作被收录入实验研究方法权威工具书Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology。曾获"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖"，2016-2018连续三年获"中国信息经济学青年创新奖"。