讲座主题：Non-linear Incentive and Worker’s Performance: Evidence from Personnel Data

主讲人：哈佛大学经济学博士、新加坡国立大学助理教授黄炜

时间：2018年7月2日（周一）下午14：00

地点：bevictor伟德210会议室

主持人：李井奎教授

主办单位：浙江省一流学科“理论经济学”西方经济学方向、经济理论与可持续发展研究中心

主讲人简介：

Dr HUANG Wei is the President’s Assistant Professor in the Department of Real Estate and Department of Strategy and Policy at National University of Singapore. Prior to joining NUS, Dr Huang was a Post-doctoral Fellow in Aging and Health Economics at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Dr Huang received his PhD in economics from Harvard University in 2016. He received an M.A in economics from National School of Development at Peking University in 2011, and a B.A. in physics from School of Physics at Peking University in 2008.His research fields are public economics, labor economics, and health economics. He is interested in the topics such as health, education, ethnicity, and China. His research work has been published in journals such as Review of Economic and Statistics, Journal of Labor Economics, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Nature, Journal of Economic Perspectives, etc. He is an editor for Economics of Transition.

内容摘要:

We use the proprietary personnel data from 2013 to 2016 of one of the largest insurance companies in China to investigate how workers behavior response to non-linear and period-based compensation scheme reform. In January 2015, the company unexpected reformed the reward scheme to the newly comers with tenure shorter than 12 months. Using the scheme-updated date as the exogenous event, we estimate a Regression Discontinuity Design and Difference-in-Differencesmodel and obtain the impulse responses of salespersons. Above all, the reform-induced increased incentive significantly and substantially increased not only the performance but also the probability of staying in the company of the treated salespersons. Meanwhile, the sales of insurance products that are not covered by the reward scheme significantly declined but in a smaller magnitude. Finally, our back of envelope calculations suggest that both the company and the workers benefit from the reward scheme reform.